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We revisit the analysis of discrete comparative statics eﬀects in
the classical consumer expenditure minimization framework, using
techniques that exploit the order and lattice properties of the prob-
lem, without reference to topological properties. It is shown that
these comparative statics eﬀects give rise to classes of partial or-
ders, which in turn induce lattice structures that deﬁne the critical
points of comparability (for the behavior of the utility function),
meets and joins, which are used to derive suﬃcient conditions, from
the quasi-supermodular class of properties, for a good(s) to be a
net substitute or complement of another. Examples demonstrate
the analysis.
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0. INTRODUCTION
The subject matter of this paper is a simple problem. Comparative statics in the
classic expenditure minimization problem.1 The proposed approach is novel and the
ensuing comparative statics results both new and useful, it is hoped. The approach is
perhaps best understood as an extension of revealed preference analysis.
Within a discrete comparative statics environment, the intuition for the proposed
approach is very simple. We wish to give suﬃcient conditions for a good to be a
net substitute of another good. Suppose we are presented with a pair of bundles,
candidates for being expenditure minimizing bundles at a relevant pair of prices, which
contradicted the net substitute condition for the good in question. Suppose also that
in such a case we could pinpoint to another pair of bundles, which themselves were
candidates for being expenditure minimizing at the same price-utility conﬁgurations,
and which did indeed satisfy the net substitute condition for the same good. If the
level of utility at the four bundles could be related in such a way as to exclude the
possibility that the original pair were indeed expenditure minimizing, then we would
have suﬃcient conditions for the comparative statics problem at hand.
This is indeed what the theorems of this paper state, albeit somewhat more formally.
But this simple intuition is the guiding light. It suggests that in this discrete com-
parative statics framework, we are to seek informative binary comparisons between
bundles. Such comparisons will be all the more meaningful if they are transitive, and
indeed if the underlying binary relations are reﬂexive, antisymmetric and transitive
(partial orders). Thus we exploit the order structure of the consumption set, as a
partially ordered set with partial order(s) which give rise to the required comparative
statics implications. Next, our intuition suggests that we are to search systematically
for alternative pairs of bundles which can be used to exclude candidate pairs of bundles
from being expenditure minimizing, if they do not satisfy the required comparative
statics result. Joins and meets provide the natural candidates for such alternative
pairs of bundles. Thus, in addition to the order structure of the consumption set, we
also exploit the induced lattice structure of the set. The ﬁnal step in our intuition is to
relate the level of utility at an original pair of bundles, with the proposed alternative
pair, their join and meet. We can do this with the supermodular class of properties on
1The producer cost-minimization problem is analogous. We refer only to the consumer problem in
this paper for convenience.3
functions (see Milgrom and Shannon (1994) and also Veinott (1992)). We have thus
all the ingredients for the proposed lattice programming approach. It relies on the or-
der/lattice structure of the problem without recourse to the topological properties of
the problem (as in the standard implicit function theorem based comparative statics
analysis).
Lattice programming methods have a relatively short, but remarkable, track record
in economics. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) introduced ordinal lattice programming
methods to economics.2 Their main comparative statics theorem states that if a func-
tion which is being maximized is quasi-supermodular3 and the constraint sets, within
a lattice, are strong set comparable, then and only then, the corresponding optimizer
sets are strong set comparable and the optimized objective is itself quasi-supermodular
in the relevant parameters of the problem. As suggested above, quasi-supermodularity
relates to the behavior of functions at the join (least upper bound) and meet (greatest
lower bound) of a pair of points, vis-` a-vis its values at the original pair of points.
Strong set comparability is set comparability that again utilizes the lattice structure
of the underlying set (unlike say set inclusion which does not) comparing the set
inclusion of joins and meets of pairs of points in the sets to be compared.4
This is an impressive and general result. The issue is the applicability of this
theorem (as well as adjacent theorems by Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Veinott,
(1992), Antoniadou, (1996), and others) to a variety of economics problems, something
which can be surprisingly diﬃcult in problems with budgetary trade-oﬀs between
variables. The application presented here demonstrates how such diﬃculties may be
overcome, by applying the methodological approach put forward in Antoniadou (1996),
namely that a most critical element in the application of the lattice programming
approach is the choice of appropriate underlying partial order(s), and corresponding
lattice structure, appropriate to each speciﬁc problem.
The plan of the paper is as follows; section 1 gives order theoretic deﬁnitions of net
substitutes and complements which are used to motivate the binary relations which
2Cardinal lattice theoretic methods, building primarily on Topkis (1978) were previously used in
economics.
3Veinott (1992) also deﬁned the same property under the term lattice superextremal. Here we use
the more standard quasi-supermodular term.
4As its name indicates, it is a strong concept of comparability (we will give the formal deﬁnition
later). In particular, if the optimizers are unique, strong set comparability of the sets of optimizers
means that the optimizers are comparable with respect to the underlying order; for example, if
this is the Euclidean order, then it simply says that one optimizer is smaller than another in every
component.4
it is argued must be satisﬁed by partial orders appropriate for comparative statics
analysis in the consumer expenditure minimization problem. The approach is partly
demonstrated in the special case of two goods. Section 2 uses the general principles laid
out in the ﬁrst section to state suﬃcient conditions for a good to be a net substitute
or complement of another. Section 3 demonstrates in the case of three goods, which
also gives the ﬁrst description of Net Substitute and Net Complement Partial Orders.
Section 4 extends the construction of such partial orders when there are many goods.
Section 5 revisits the theorems of section 2 in light of the speciﬁc partial orders put
forward. Section 6 concludes.
1. DISCRETE NET SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS AND SUITABLE
PARTIAL ORDERS
In order to apply lattice programming techniques to the comparative statics analysis
of the consumer expenditure minimization problem, the consumption set must be
endowed with partial order(s), which can simultaneously accommodate the description
of such eﬀects, while enabling the application of these comparative statics techniques.
For the latter the consumption set (and feasible sets therein) must be closed under
relevant joins and meets. For, in this setting, joins and meets identify the crucial points
of comparability. It is the nature of the behavior of the utility function at joins and
meets, vis-` a-vis its behavior at pairs of (incomparable) elements of the consumption
set, which will enable the derivation of suﬃcient conditions for such comparative
statics analysis. Accordingly, the underlying partial order(s) on the consumption set
will not only be important in describing the comparative statics eﬀect, but will also
be very important in determining the strength of the suﬃcient conditions derived.5
Thus, we begin by constructing partial orders describing net substitution eﬀects from
a minimal set of binary relations that must hold whenever net substitution eﬀects can
be analyzed. These binary relations are simply those that are implied by the weak
axiom of revealed preference.
5Intuitively, the more parsimonious the description of a speciﬁc comparative statics eﬀect en-
abled by a partial order, the stronger the suﬃcient conditions for it which can be derived from the
application of lattice programming techniques with that partial order. For example, products of
component-wise orders could be used to describe any number of comparative statics changes, but
such ’descriptions’ would not be parsimonious with respect to any particular comparative statics
eﬀect and the comparability enabled by such partial orders would not be particularly informative or
useful.5
Consumer preferences are represented by a utility function, U : X → <, deﬁned
over the consumption set, X (element x ∈ X) subset of the commodity space <n.
In particular, the consumer has preferences over n goods, named i = 1,...,n.6 The
discrete comparative statics question to be addressed is that of the net substitutability
of good i for good j, in the expenditure minimization problem. More precisely, given
prices p = (p1,...,pn) and p0 = (p1,...,pj−1,p0
j,pj+1,...,pn), with p,p0 ∈ <n
++, and
such that without loss of generality (w.l.o.g. hereafter) pj < p0
j, attainable utility
level ¯ u, and corresponding expenditure minimizing bundles, ˆ x and ˆ x0 (i.e. ˆ x =
argmin{p · x | x ∈ X, U(x) ≥ ¯ u}, and similarly for ˆ x0), the comparability of ˆ xi and
ˆ x0
i (ˆ xi < ˆ x0
i or ˆ x0
i < ˆ xi) is the issue.7
Unlike implicit function based comparative statics approaches, with the lattice pro-
gramming approach optimizers need not be assumed to be unique. Therefore, we ad-
just the above statement accordingly. But the approach has also a drawback, namely
that it does not allow for the investigation of strict inequality relations as suggested
above. This is also taken into account in the formal deﬁnition below:
Definition 1.1.
(a) Good i is a Strongly Net Substitute of good j at price pair p,p0 ∈ <n
++,
p = (p1,...,pn), p0 = (p1,...,pj−1,p0
j,pj+1,...,pn), with pj < p0
j, and at attainable
utility level ¯ u, if:
argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U(x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤s argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x| U(x) ≥ ¯ u}
where ≤s is the strongly-lower-than set relation8 compatible with a partial order, ≤ns,
on the consumption set X, which implies, whenever x ≤ns x0:
S1: xi ≤ x0
i
Such partial orders on the consumption set will be called Net Substitutes Partial Orders
(denoted NSPOs).9
6Below we will need to distinguish between the index 1,...,n of a good and its name 1,...,n.
Thus, an indexing of goods will be a one to one mapping from the names of goods onto their indices.
However, where this is not confusing, we assume the natural indexing of goods, where the name and
index of each good coincide.
7Statements relating to the symmetry of net substitution eﬀects are avoided, since symmetry is a
derived rather than an axiomatic property.
8A subset A of a poset (S, ≤) is strongly-lower-than subset B, A ≤s B, iﬀ for each x ∈ A, and
y ∈ B, x ≤ y in S. This deﬁnition is due to Veinott.
9Requiring the underlying binary relations to be partial orders is important for the proposed
analysis. Nonetheless, reﬂexivity, antisymmetry and also transitivity are not unduly restrictive for6
Good i is a Pathwise Net Substitute of good j at price pair p,p0 ∈ <n
++ and
attainable utility level ¯ u, if the set relation ≤s above is replaced with ≤P, the pathwise
compatible set relation.10
If i = j in the deﬁnitions above, then good i is a Strongly (Pathwise) Own Net
Substitute at price pair (p,p0) and at attainable utility level ¯ u.
Good i is a Strongly (Pathwise) Net Substitute of good j (everywhere), if it is
a Strongly (Pathwise) Net Substitute of good j at every such price pair, p,p0 ∈ <n
++,
and level of attainable utility ¯ u.
(b) Good i is a Strongly (Pathwise) Net Complement of good j at price pair p,p0 ∈
<n
++ and attainable utility level ¯ u (everywhere), as in (a) above, if the underlying
partial order ≤ns in (a) is replaced with a partial order, ≤nc, on the consumption set
X which implies, whenever x ≤nc x0:
C1: x0
i ≤ xi
Such partial orders on the consumption set will be called Net Complements Partial
Orders (denoted NCPOs).
It will prove convenient below, in the construction of Net Substitute (Complement)
Partial Orders, as in deﬁnition 1.1, to assume i = 1 and j = n, in the name, and every
relevant indexing of goods. Since this involves no loss of generality we will adopt it
from now on without further comment.
Deﬁnition 1.1 gives necessary restrictions on NSPOs and NCPOs in conditions S1
and C1, with respect to good 1 (good i more generally) comparability. However,
using revealed preference, we can establish that deﬁnition 1.1 suggests two further
restrictions on NSPOs and NCPOs, in order to perform their descriptive role within
the context of the expenditure minimization problem. Whenever x,x0 are expenditure
minimizing bundles at prices p,p0 respectively, as in deﬁnition 1.1:
H1: p · x ≤ p · x0 and H2: p0 · x0 ≤ p0 · x
the purposes of the deﬁnition alone, in as much as they relate to physical attributes of consumption
bundles. The deﬁnition makes clear that such underlying partial orders need not be unique.
10A subset A of a poset (S,≤) is pathwise-lower-than subset B, A ≤P B, iﬀ for each x ∈ A (y ∈ B)
there exists y ∈ B (x ∈ A) such that x ≤ y in S (Antoniadou, 1996).7
For obvious reasons we will call all pairs satisfying H1 and H2, Hicks Consistent pairs
(at prices p,p0), and argue that NSPO/NCPO comparability must incorporate Hicks
Consistency on the consumption set.11
Thus, from now on it will be assumed that, whenever pair x,y are comparable with
respect to a NSPO, with x ≤ns y, then (S1) x1 ≤ y1, (H1) p · x ≤ p · y, and (H2)
p0 · y ≤ p0 · x. Similarly, whenever pair x,y are comparable with respect to a NCPO,
with x ≤nc y, then (C1) y1 ≤ x1, (H1) p · x ≤ p · y and (H2) p0 · y ≤ p0 · x (where
p,p0 ∈ <n
++, with p = (p1,...,pn), p0 = (p1,...,pn−1,p0
n), and pn < p0
n).12
In fact with two goods H1 and H2 themselves deﬁne a partial order, while with three
goods H1 and H2 with either S1 or C1 deﬁne a partial order. However, these conditions
are no longer suﬃcient to completely deﬁne partial orders with four or more goods
and therefore, in these more general cases, we have the task of constructing partial
orders, NSPOs and NCPOs, without further (unwarranted) descriptive content, but
with useful normative content. Before we do so however, we will present the main
comparatives statics theorems of the paper in the next section. These presume the
existence of NSPOs and NCPOs, but do not use their speciﬁc properties. It is hoped
that these will motivate the constructions of NSPOs and NCPOs that are suggested
in subsequent sections.
Even though the two goods case is too special to avail itself to the theorems of the
next section, it is useful for motivating and expositing the proposed lattice structures
and is therefore presented here:
11Thus the property, Hicks Consistency, which must hold at expenditure minimizing bundles is
extended to all comparable pairs of bundles. This is justiﬁed since comparability is determined a
priori. Also, it must be noted that H1 and H2 depend on the price pair, and therefore the partial
orders themselves will depend on the particular price pair. Thus, when we refer to a particular NSPO
or NCPO this will be a class of partial orders and not a unique partial order.
12An elementary observation is that, given the restriction on the pair of prices, H1 and H2 jointly
imply yn ≤ xn (strict inequality if at least one of H1, H2 is strict). This is a restatement of the
compensated law of demand, when only the price of one good changes (which is equivalent to the
weak axiom of revealed preference). In the context of this paper, its implication is that a partial
order which enables the derivation of suﬃcient conditions for good 1 to be a strongly/pathwise net
substitute/complement of good n, will also imply that the latter is a Strongly Own Net Substitute
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with the (p,p 0) NSPO is depicted by the
shaded area. Notice that the intersection of this set with the up-set of x under the Euclidean order
is a singleton, x itself.
Special Case: Two Goods
It is easy to establish that with two goods H1 and H2 together imply S1 and that
in fact H1 and H2 deﬁne a partial order on <2. Therefore, a NCPO for two goods
does not exist, while the NSPO (clearly unique) can be completely deﬁned by H1, H2
alone. Thus, let us deﬁne:
Definition 1.2. A pair x,y in <2, is comparable with respect to the (p,p0) Net
Substitutes Partial Order (NSPO 2) on <2, w.l.o.g. x ≤2
ns y, if and only if:
H1: p1x1 + p2x2 ≤ p1y1 + p2y2 and H2 : p1y1 + p0
2y2 ≤ p1x1 + p0
2x2
where p = (p1,p2) ∈ <2
++ and p0 = (p1,p0
2) with p2 < p0
2.
Verifying that the (p,p0) Net Substitutes Partial Order on <2 is indeed a partial
order (reﬂexive, antisymmetric, and transitive) is immediate. It is also immediate to
show that: x ≤2
ns y implies x1 ≤ y1 and y2 ≤ x2, and, x ≤2
ns y with x 6= y imply
x1 < y1 and y2 < x2. The up-set of any point in <2 can be depicted graphically as in
Figure 1.
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demonstrated in Figure 2.
Nonetheless, this lattice structure is not useful in the case of two goods. Be-
cause, no additional assumptions are needed in order to establish that whenever
ˆ x ∈ argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U(x) ≥ ¯ u} and ˆ x0 ∈ argmin
x∈X
{p0 ·x| U(x) ≥ ¯ u}, then ˆ x ≤2
ns ˆ x0,
thus restating the elementary result that with two goods, good 1 is a Strongly Net
Substitute of good 2 everywhere (and vice versa), and that each good is a Strongly
Own Net Substitute, according to Deﬁnition 1.1 above, without further conditions.
The reader familiar with what has come to be known as the Monotone Comparative
Statics literature may ponder what this may suggest about the quasi-supermodular





. It should not be taken to suggest
that such properties are not restrictive; rather the restictions that they impose are





are necessarily not Hicks Consistent.
This is a critical observation. The proposed NSPOs and NCPOs can induce a
rich lattice structure. The expenditure minimization problem however does not need
to make use of all this structure. Only the behavior of the utility function at Hicks
Consistent pairs, their meets and joins, is relevant. The behavior of the utility function
at incomparable pairs that are not Hicks Consistent will not add useful information
for the expenditure minimization problem. Thus, we will use the following deﬁnitions:10
Definition 1.3.
(a) <n endowed with a Net Substitutes Partial Order (satisfying S1, H1 and H2)
is called a (p,p0) Net Substitutes Poset and denoted (<n,≤ns). Similarly, <n endowed
with a Net Complements Partial Order (satisfying C1, H1 and H2) is called a (p,p0)
Net Complements Poset and denoted (<n,≤nc).
(b) A subset X of <n is called a Hicks Consistent Sublattice of (<n,≤ns) (alterna-
tively of (<n,≤nc)), if the join and meet of every Hicks Consistent pair in (<n,≤ns)
(alternatively in (<n,≤nc)) taken in <n exists in X. It is a Hicks Consistent Lattice
if the meet and join of every Hicks Consistent pair in X, taken in X, exists in X.
(c) A real-valued function f : X → < on a Hicks Consistent (sub)lattice is called
Hicks Consistent Quasi-Supermodular if it is quasi-supermodular at Hicks Consistent
pairs in X, i.e. for all Hicks Consistent pairs x,y such that (H1) p·x ≤ p·y and (H2)
p0 · y ≤ p0 · x:
f (x ∧ y)≤
<
f (x) =⇒ f (y)≤
<
f (x ∨ y) and f (x ∧ y)≤
<
f (y) =⇒ f (x)≤
<
f (x ∨ y) 13
Similarly, f is called Hicks Consistent Strictly Quasi-Supermodular if it is strictly
quasi-supermodular at Hicks Consistent incomparable pairs of points in X, i.e.
f (x ∧ y) ≤ f (x) =⇒ f (y) < f (x ∨ y) and f (x ∧ y) ≤ f (y) =⇒ f (x) < f (x ∨ y) 14
(d) A real-valued function f : X → < on a Hicks Consistent (sub)lattice is called
Hicks Consistent Lower-Semi-Quasi-Supermodular if for all Hicks Consistent pairs x,y
such that (H1) p · x ≤ p · y and (H2) p0 ·y ≤ p0 · x:
f (x ∧ y)≤
<
f (x) =⇒ f (y)≤
<
f (x ∨ y) 15
Similarly f is called Hicks Consistent Strictly Lower-Semi-Quasi-Supermodular if in-
stead:
f (x ∧ y) ≤ f (x) =⇒ f (y) < f (x ∨ y) 16
(e) A real-valued function f : X → < on a Hicks Consistent (sub)lattice is called
Hicks Consistent Iso-Quasi-Supermodular if it is quasi-supermodular, as in (c) above,
13Equivalently: f (x ∨ y)≤
<
f (y) ⇒ f (x)≤
<
f (x ∧ y) and f (x ∨ y)≤
<
f (x) ⇒ f (y)≤
<
f (x ∧ y).
14Equivalently: f (x ∨ y) ≤ f (y) ⇒ f (x) < f (x ∧ y) and f (x ∨ y) ≤ f (x) ⇒ f (y) < f (x ∧ y).
15Equivalently: f (x ∨ y)≤
<
f (y) ⇒ f (x)≤
<
f (x ∧ y).
16Equivalently: f (x ∨ y) ≤ f (y) ⇒ f (x) < f (x ∧ y).11
at Hicks Consistent pairs, x,y, which in addition satisfy f(x) = f(y).
Similarly f is called Hicks Consistent Strictly Iso-Quasi-Supermodular if instead it
is strictly quasi-supermodular at Hicks Consistent incomparable pairs, x,y, which in
addition satisfy f(x) = f(y). Equivalently, for all such x,y:
f (x) = f (y) < f (x∨ y) or f (y) = f (x) < f (x ∧ y)
The deﬁnition of a (strictly) quasi-supermodular function in Deﬁnition 1.3 is stan-
dard (Milgrom and Shannon 1994).17 The deﬁnitions of a (strictly) lower-semi-
quasi-supermodular and of (strictly) iso-quasi-supermodular function are new, weaker,
variants of the standard deﬁnitions. A (strictly) iso-quasi-supermodular function is
(strictly) semi-quasi-supermodular and a (strictly) semi-quasi-supermodular function
is (strictly) quasi-supermodular.
We turn without further discussion to the main theorems of the paper, which, it is
hoped, will make the usefulness of these deﬁnitions apparent.
2. THEOREMS FOR NET SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS
In this section we use the general properties of NSPOs and NCPOs, as discussed
in the previous section, to derive suﬃcient conditions for net substitution eﬀects as in
deﬁnition 1.1. We have already seen how such partial order(s) can be constructed in
the case of two goods. The NSPOs and NCPOs constructed in the following sections
show how this can be done with three or more goods (for obvious reasons we assume
in this section that there are at least three goods). It is on balance appropriate to
give the theorems before discussing the construction of the relevant partial orders in
order to indicate in advance their usefulness. The theorems will be revisited once the
NSPOs and NCPOs have been discussed more fully in the following sections.
Theorem 2.1 (Net Substitutes).
Consider the consumer expenditure minimization problem, EM(p, ¯ u):
min{p · x | x ∈ X, U(x) ≥ ¯ u}
(a) If:
17This is also the same as the deﬁnition of a (strictly) lattice superextremal function due to Veinott
1992.12
(A) The consumption set X, X ⊂ <n, is a Hicks Consistent (Sub)lattice of a
(p,p0) Net Substitutes poset (<n,≤ns), under some indexing of goods (with good 1
given index 1 and good n index n);
(B) The consumer utility function U : X → < is Hicks Consistent Iso-Quasi-
Supermodular on X;
Then, given feasible ¯ u, such that solutions to the problems EM(p, ¯ u) and EM(p0, ¯ u)
exist and are such that there is no excess utility:
argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤a argmin
x∈X




{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤P argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x|U (x) ≥ ¯ u}
i.e. good 1 is a Pathwise Net Substitute of good n at prices (p,p0) and at every such
attainable utility level, ¯ u.
(b) If instead of (A) and (B) in part (a), (A), (B0) hold, where
(B0) The consumer utility function U : X → < is Hicks Consistent Strictly
Iso-Quasi-Supermodular on X, and
Then, given feasible ¯ u, such that solutions to the problems EM(p, ¯ u) and EM(p0, ¯ u)
exist and are such that there is no excess utility:
argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤c argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x|U (x) ≥ ¯ u} 19
If in addition:
(C) I ≡ argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ∩ argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x|U (x) ≥ ¯ u} contains no




{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤s argmin
x∈X
{p
0 · x|U (x) ≥ ¯ u}
i.e. good 1 is a Strongly Net Substitute of good n at prices (p,p0) and at every such
attainable utility level, ¯ u.
18Subset A is strong set smaller than subset B, A ≤a B, if A ∧ B ⊆ A and A ∨ B ⊆ B.
19Subset A is chain-lower-than subset B, A ≤c B, if A ≤a B and for each a ∈ A and b ∈ B, a and
b are comparable. Both this deﬁnition and the deﬁnition of strong set comparability are due Veinott.13
Remark 2. 1. As stated the theorem does not give suﬃcient conditions for the min-
imization problems to have solutions, nor for these to imply no excess utility at all ex-
penditure minimizing bundles. Standard assumptions can be employedfor this. No ex-
cess utility is a standard assumption in the classical comparative statics analysis of this
problem. However, it is important that the proposed approach, and in particular the-
orem 2.1, can accommodate discrete, ﬁnite consumption sets, where this assumption
may not be justiﬁable. If so, the statment of the theorem can be adjusted by changing
assumptions (B) and (B0) to: U is Hicks Consistent Lower-Semi-Quasi-Supermodular
and Hicks Consistent Strictly Lower-Semi-Quasi-Supermodular, respectively. State-
ment argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤a argmin
x∈X
























subsequent statements adjusted correspondingly).
Proof (Theorem 2.1).
(a) Consider ˆ x ∈ argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} and ˆ x0 ∈ argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u}
which by assumption exist and are such that U (ˆ x) = U (ˆ x0) = ¯ u. Clearly ˆ x, ˆ x0 are by
deﬁnition Hicks Consistent, i.e. (H1) p · ˆ x ≤ p · ˆ x0 and (H2) p0 · ˆ x0 ≤ p0 · ˆ x. If both of
these are satisﬁed with equality, then either ˆ x ≤ns ˆ x0 or ˆ x0 ≤ns ˆ x, but also in this case
ˆ x, ˆ x0 ∈ argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} and ˆ x, ˆ x0 ∈ argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u}. Thus, in
either case ˆ x∧ ˆ x0 ∈ argmin
x∈X
{p ·x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} and ˆ x∨ ˆ x0 ∈ argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u}
as required. Therefore, assume that at lease one of (H1), (H2) is a strict inequal-
ity. If ˆ x, ˆ x0 are comparable, ˆ x ≤n
ns ˆ x0 and there is nothing further to prove. Hence
assume that they are not comparable, i.e. ˆ x0
1 < ˆ x1. From assumption (A) their
join and meet exist, and furthermore these satisfy (1) p0 · (ˆ x ∨ ˆ x0) ≤ p0 · ˆ x0, and (2)
p · (ˆ x ∧ ˆ x0) ≤ p · ˆ x, (also ˆ x1 ≤ (ˆ x ∨ ˆ x0)1 and (ˆ x ∧ ˆ x0)1 ≤ ˆ x0
1). Using the deﬁnition of
ˆ x, ˆ x0 (under no excess utility) these imply (10) U (ˆ x) = U (ˆ x0) ≥ U (ˆ x ∨ ˆ x0) and (20)
U (ˆ x0) = U (ˆ x) ≥ U (ˆ x ∧ ˆ x0) respectively (strict inequalities if (a) or (b) are strict). But
these and the assumption that U is Hicks Consistent iso-quasi-supermodular (assump-
tion (B)) imply (100) U (ˆ x) = U (ˆ x0) ≤ U (ˆ x ∧ ˆ x0) and (200) U (ˆ x0) = U (ˆ x) ≤ U (ˆ x ∨ ˆ x0)
respectively (strict inequalities if (10) or (20) are strict). Therefore, (1) or (2) strict
imply a contradiction and the hypothesis that ˆ x, ˆ x0 are incomparable is false. Other-14
wise, U (ˆ x) = U (ˆ x0) = U (ˆ x ∧ ˆ x0) = U (ˆ x ∨ ˆ x0) and ˆ x ∧ ˆ x0 ∈ argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u}
and ˆ x ∨ ˆ x0 ∈ argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} as required to complete the proof.
(b) The proof of this part is very similar to that of part (a) and will therefore not be
repeated here. We note that case assumption (C) implies that at least one of (H1) and
(H2) is a strict inequality if ˆ x 6= ˆ x0. Hence if ˆ x, ˆ x0 are comparable there is nothing to
prove. An analogous argument to that in (a) can be used to establish by contradiction
that ˆ x, ˆ x0 cannot be incomparable, thus completing the proof.
Theorem 2.2 below is the analog of theorem 2.1 in the case of net complements.
But it bears a warning: as will be shown in the following sections, the assumption
that the consumption set X is a (sub)lattice of the relevant poset is more diﬃcult to
establish here than in the case of net substitutes, especially if X is assumed to be a
set bounded from below, a standard assumption in economics:
Theorem 2.2 (Net Complements).
Consider the consumer expenditure minimization problem, EM(p, ¯ u), as in theorem
2.1 above.
(a) If:
(A) The consumption set X, X ⊂ <n, is a Hicks Consistent (Sub)lattice of a
(p,p0) Net Complements poset (<n,≤nc), under some indexing of goods giving good 1
index 1 and good n index n;
(B) The consumer utility function U : X → < is Hicks Consistent Iso-Quasi-
Supermodular on X.
Then, given feasible ¯ u, such that solutions to the problems EM(p, ¯ u) and EM(p0, ¯ u)
exist and are such that there is no excess utility:
argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤a argmin
x∈X




{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤P argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x|U (x) ≥ ¯ u}
i.e. good 1 is a Pathwise Net Complement of good n at prices (p,p0) and at every such
attainable utility level, ¯ u.15
(b) If instead of (A) and (B) in part (a), (A), (B0) hold, where:
(B0) The consumer utility function U : X → < is Hicks Consistent Strictly
Iso-Quasi-Supermodular on X.
Then given feasible ¯ u, such that solutions to the problems EM(p, ¯ u) and EM(p0, ¯ u)
exist and are such that there is no excess utility:
argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤c argmin
x∈X
{p




{p· x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ∩ argmin
x∈X





{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤s argmin
x∈X
{p
0 · x|U (x) ≥ ¯ u}
i.e. Good 1 is a Strongly Net Complement of good n at prices (p,p0) and every such
attainable utility level, ¯ u.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of theorem 2.1 and is omitted.
It is straightforward to extend theorems 2.1 and 2.2 to give suﬃcient conditions
for good 1 to be a Pathwise/Strongly Net Substitute or Complement of good n ev-
erywhere, by requiring conditions (A) and (B), or (B0), to hold in every such poset
generated under all possible such price pairs (p,p0). It is also possible to weaken the
suﬃcient conditions of theorems 2.1 and 2.2 so that good 1 is a Pathwise/Strongly
Net Substitute or Complement of good n at a particular price pair (p,p0) and par-
ticular attainable utility level (which may be more satisfactory especially in the case
of net complements), by requiring that the consumption set be closed under joins
and meets of Hicks Consistent pairs in the corresponding weakly preferred set (rather
than all Hicks Consistent pairs). Also, these suﬃcient conditions can apply,and can be
checked, with respect to more than one pair of goods simultaneously, thus establishing
conditions for the nature of net substitutability of a group of goods with respect to
any one good.16
3. NSPOS AND NCPOS WITH THREE GOODS
The aim of this and the following section is to show how partial orders, that may
be used to apply the comparative statics theorems of the previous section, can be
constructed. We begin with the special case of three goods in this section.
Unlike the case of two goods, with three goods H1 and H2 alone do not deﬁne
a partial order. Nonetheless, the three goods case is itself special because S1 (C1)
suﬃces, along with H1 and H2, to deﬁne completely a partial order something which
is not true with a larger number of goods. So let us begin by deﬁning the NSPO and
the NCPO (importantly these are unique) in three dimensions:
Definition 3.1.
(a) A pair x,y in <3, is comparable with respect to the (p,p0) Net Substitutes
Partial Order (NSPO3) on <3, w.l.o.g. x ≤3
ns y, if and only if:
S1: x1 ≤ y1 H1: p · x ≤ p · y and H2 : p0 · y ≤ p0 · x
(b) A pair x,y in <3, is comparable with respect to the (p,p0) Net Complements
Partial Order (NCPO3) on <3, w.l.o.g. x ≤3
nc y, if and only if:
C1: y1 ≤ x1 H1: p · x ≤ p · y and H2: p0 · y ≤ p0 · x
where p ∈ <3
++ and p0 = (p1,p2,p0
3) with p3 < p0
3.










are Hicks Consistent lattices. In fact, given Hicks Con-






that (w.l.o.g.): (NS1) y1 < x1, (H1) p · x ≤ p · y, and (H2) p0 · y ≤ p0 · x (at least




p2 (x1 − y1),y 3
´
and




p2 (x1 − y1),x3
´
.21 Furthermore, the join and meet of x,y satisfy:
20One simple fact which distinguishes NCPO3 from NSPO3, is that x ≤3
nc y implies x2 ≤ y2 (i.e.
y1 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ y2 and y3 ≤ x3).This again restates what we would have expected, namely that with
three goods two goods cannot be both simultaneously net complements of the third one (with strict
inequalities).
21Theproof thatthese arethe joinand meet of x,y is straightforward. Here wesketch theargument




p2 (x1 − y1),y3
¢
. Clearly p · z = p · y, p0 · z = p0 · y and therefore
x,y ≤3
ns z, i.e. z is an upper bound. Consider any upper bound of x,y, say r ≡ (r1,r2,r3). By
deﬁnition, x1 ≤ r1, p · y ≤ p · r and p0 · r ≤ p0 · y. Thus z1 ≤ r1, p · z ≤ p · r, and p0 · r ≤ p0 · z, i.e.
z ≤3
ns r as required, establishing z = x ∨ y.17
x2 < (x ∨ y)2 < y2 and x2 < (x ∧ y)2 < y2, with (x ∨ y)2 + (x ∧ y)2 = x2 + y2.
Therefore, x,y ∈ <3
+ implies x ∨ y,x ∧ y ∈ <3
+ and <3
+ is closed under joins and





. The join and meet also satisfy:
p · (x ∨ y) = p · y, p0 · (x ∨ y) = p0 · y, p · (x ∧ y) = p · x, p0 · (x ∧ y) = p0 · x.
The construction of joins and meets under NCPO3 is analogous. Given Hicks Con-






that (w.l.o.g.): (NC1) x1 < y1, (H1) p · x ≤ p · y, and (H2) p0 · y ≤ p0 · x (at




p2 (y1 − x1),y 3
´
and




p2 (y1 − x1),x3
´
.22 Furthermore the join and meet of x,y satisfy
p · (x ∨ y) = p · y, p0 · (x ∨ y) = p0 · y, p · (x ∧ y) = p · x, p0 · (x ∧ y) = p0 · x,
x2,y 2 < (x∨ y)2 and (x ∧ y)2 < x2,y 2, with (x ∨ y)2 + (x ∧ y)2 = x2 + y2. Thus
x,y ∈ <3
+ implies x ∨ y ∈ <3
+, but not necessarily so for the meet. Thus <3
+ is closed






The partial orders NSPO3 and NCPO3 are obviously related; whenever a Hicks
Consistent pair x,y at prices p,p0, is incomparable with respect to NSPO3 it is com-
parable with respect to NCPO3, and vice versa. Thus, even though joins and meets
of Hicks Consistent pairs incomparable with respect to NCPO3 take the same form as
those of Hicks Consistent pairs incomparable with respect to NSPO3, the points where
these occur are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, it is important to note that despite
their algebraic similarity, while <3













In fact this diﬀerence between NSPO3 and NCPO3 is even more pervasive. It is not
diﬃcult to verify that <3
+ is not closed under meets of Hicks Consistent pairs under








will extend to the n-dimensional extensions of NSPOs and NCPOs. What is critical
about <3
+, or <n
+ more generally, is that it is bounded below, and indeed it can be
established that this diﬀerence between the NSPOs and NCPOs extends to any such
22The argument establishing that these are the join and meet, respectively, of x,y is analogous to




p2 (y1 − x1),x3
¢
.
Clearly p · w = p · x, p0 · w = p0 · x and therefore w ≤3
nc x,y, i.e. w is a lower bound. Consider any
other lower bound of x,yr ≤ p·x and p0·x ≤ p0·r. Therefore, w1 ≤ r1, p·r ≤ p·w, and p0·w ≤ p0 ·r,
i.e. r ≤3
nc w as required, establishing w = x ∧ y.
23ThemeetdoesnotexistforHicksConsistentincomparablepairs x,y such that p1x1+p2x2 < p1y1
(whereby hypothesis x1 < y1). This could nothappen in the case of a Hicks Consistent incomparable
pair under NSPO3 since in that case the corresponding hypothesis would be y1 < x1.18
set bounded from below. Since the non-negative quadrant (or other sets bounded from
below) is often assigned to be the consumer consumption set, this contrast between
the Net Substitutes and Net Complements Partial Orders is important and alludes
to something intuitive, that it is more diﬃcult to establish the net complementarity,
that the net subsitutability, of a good for another at every attainable utility level.
Before going on to the more general case, with four or more goods, we conclude this
section with two simple examples, Cobb-Douglas preferences and quasi-linear prefer-
ences. The comparative statics results in these examples are known, the method of
arriving at these is clearly diﬀerent. They show that having established the basic prop-
erties of NSPO3, the relevantnet substitute posets and Hicks Consistent (sub)lattices,
the comparative statics analysis involves little more than elementary inequality ma-
nipulation:
Example 3.1. If the consumer utility function over three goods is Cobb-Douglas:
U : <3
+ → < U (x) ≡ xα
1x2x
γ
3 α,γ > 0







, for every pair of prices p,p0 such that p ∈ <3
++
and p0 = (p1,p2,p0
3) with p3 < p0
3. It is strictly quasi-supermodular at Hicks Consistent
pairs in the interior of the consumption set, <3
++.
(b) Each good is a strongly net substitute of every other good everywhere (at
positive utility levels).
Proof. (b) This follows from (a) and theorem 2.1, by observing that the indexing
of goods is inconsequential in the proof of (a) (also the argmax is a singleton):
(a) Given Hicks consistent incomparable pair x,y, such that (NS1) y1 < x1, (H1)
p · x ≤ p · y, and (H2) p0 · y ≤ p0 · x (at least one of H1, H2 strict inequality),




p2 (x1 − y1),y3
´




p2 (x1 − y1),x3
´
. Also
along with y1 < x1, we have: y3 < x3, x2 < y2, x2 < (x ∧ y)2 ,(x ∨ y)2 < y2. Thus
x1,x3,y2,(x ∧y)2,(x ∨y)2 are strictly positive. In order to prove the required result,










1 (x ∧ y)2 since x3 > 0
⇐⇒ xα
1 (x ∨ y)2 ≥ yα
1 (x ∧ y)2 + xα
1 [y2 − (x ∧ y)2] since (x ∧ y)2 + (x ∨ y)2 = x2 + y2
=⇒ xα
1 (x ∨ y)2 > yα
1 (x ∧ y)2 + yα
1 [y2 − (x ∧ y)2] since xα
1 > yα
1 , y2 − (x ∧ y)2 > 0
=⇒ xα





3 strict inequality if y3 > 0
i.e. U (x) ≥ U (x ∧ y) implies U (x ∨ y) ≥ U (y) for x,y in <3
+, and it implies
U (x ∨ y) > U (y) for x,y in <3
++.
Thus U is Hicks Consistent Lower-Semi-Quasi-Supermodular on <3
+ and stictly so on
<3
++. This suﬃces to establish (b). In order to prove that in addition U is Hicks Con-
sistent Quasi-Supermodular on <3
+, and strictly so on <3
++, assume next that U (x) ≥
U (x ∨ y). The remaining steps are as elementary as the steps above and are therefore
omitted.
Example 3.2. If the consumer utility function over three goods is given by:
U : <3
+ → < U (x) = min{x1,x2} + x3
Then goods 1 and 2 are strongly net substitutes of good 3 everywhere.
Proof. Given theorem 2.1, the result follows if we prove that the utility function






(and observe that the indexing of goods 1 and 2 is inconsequential in the
proof):
As in example 3.1, given Hicks consistent incomparable pair x,y, such that (NS1) y1 <











p2 (x1 − y1), x3
´
, y1 < x1,
wehave: y3 < x3, x2 < y2, x2 < (x ∧ y)2 , (x ∨ y)2 < y2, and x1,x3,y2,(x ∧ y)2 ,(x∨ y)2
are strictly positive. Suppose U (x) ≥ U (x ∧ y), i.e. min{x1,x2}+x3 ≥ min{y1,(x ∧ y)2}+
x3 which implies min{x1,x2}+y3 ≥ min{y1,(x ∧ y)2}+y3. If x2 < x1, i.e. min{x1,x2} =
x2, then x1 > x2 ≥ min{y1,(x ∧ y)2} implies min{y1,(x ∧ y)2} = y1 since (x ∧ y)2 >
x2. Hence U (x ∨ y) > U (y) as required since min{x1,(x ∨ y)2} > min{x1,x2} =
x2 ≥ y1 = min{y1,(x ∧ y)2} = min{y1,y2} or min{x1,(x ∨ y)2}+y3 > min{y1,y 2}+
y3. If x1 ≤ x2, i.e. min{x1,x2} = x1 then again it must be that min{y1,(x ∧ y)2} =20
y1 since (x ∧ y)2 > x2 ≥ x1 > y1. Hence in this case U (x) > U (x ∧ y) and
min{x1,(x ∨ y)2} + y3 > min{y1,y2} + y3 or U (x ∨ y) > U (y) as required, since
min{x1,(x ∨ y)2} = min{x1,x2} = x1 and min{y1,(x ∧ y)2} = min{y1,y2} = y1.
4. NSPOS AND NCPOS WITH MORE THAN THREE GOODS
With more than three goods S1, H1 and H2 (alternatively C1, H1 and H2) do not
deﬁne a partial order. There is now arbitrariness in the indexing of goods 2,...,n −1,
and corresponding ﬂexibility in their normative role. Therefore, as we have already
alluded to above, with more than three goods we must diﬀerentiate between the name,
1,...,n , of a good, and its index, 1,...,n .24
We are faced with the challenge of constructing partial orders that are descriptively
parsimonious and also normatively rich. Perhaps the most obvious and descriptively
parsimonious way to construct partial orders from S1, H1 and H2 (respectively C1,
H1 and H2) is by replacing S1 (C1) with a (generalized) lexicographic order. The
lexicographic order does not add signiﬁcantly, if at all, to the descriptive content of
an NSPO or NCPO, as deﬁned in the previous section. Its import (over and above
S1/C1) in terms of the descriptive performance of the partial order is non-vacuous only
at critical cases (when y1 = x1, where x,y is a Hicks Consistent pair). But, since the
indexing of goods (2,...,n −1) is arbitrary and since we would expect good n to have
at least one net substitute (strict inequality) this should not present a problem with
the choice of an appropriate indexing. Furthermore, the (generalized) lexicographic
order is particularly appealing in being a total binary relation (order), thus ensuring
the existence of a partial order when combined with H1 and H2. We will call the
partial orders so constructed (deﬁnition 4.1 below) the Lexicographic NSPO (denoted
LNSPO) and the Lexicographic NCPO (denoted LNCPO), respectively.
LNSPOs and LNCPOs are important in their descriptive role and also as a useful
benchmark. However, in the normative role of LNSPO and LNCPO, in the derivation
of suﬃcient conditions on the utility function, the import of the lexicographic order is
a lot more substantive, since it aﬀects the nature of joins and meets of Hicks Consistent
24Recall that an indexing of the goods is a one-to-one mapping from the names of goods onto their
indices. Obviously, the natural indexing corresponds to the identity map, and again unless otherwise
warranted we will continue using the natural indexing of goods for simplicity. For obvious reasons,
all relevant indexings of goods will be such that good 1 is mapped to index 1 and good n to index n.21
incomparable pairs in the commodity space. It enables a particularly simple form for
such joins and meets, such that only the quantities of the two goods in question and
only one other good (the good with index n −1) are adjusted.25 While the simplicity
of the construction is attractive, its inﬂexibility is a drawback. Once the indexing
of goods is determined, and in particular index n − 1 is assigned, this good is given
undue inﬂuence in the comparability of any pair of bundles without regard to any
other information that the pair of bundles may contain.
The most obvious information that we can draw from a pair of bundles, is the list of
goods that are in larger quantity in one bundle and those that are in larger quantity
in the other. This gives some a-priori information about which goods are candidates
for being net substitutes and which net complements of good n, and it would seem
appropriate that it is used. We apply this intuition to provide extensions of LNSPO
and LNCPO (deﬁnition 4.2 below) which utilize the arbitrariness of the indexing of
goods 2,...,n − 1, as suggested here, thus enhancing the normative performance of
these partial orders, while maintaining the descriptive parsimony of LNSPOs and
LNCPOs in binary comparisons. We call these partial orders Augmented LNSPO
(denoted ALNSPO) and Augmented LNCPO (denoted ALNCPO).
Definition 4.1.
(a) A pair x,y in <n, is comparable with respect to the Lexicographic (p,p0) Net
Substitutes Partial Order (LNSPO) on <n, w.l.o.g. x ≤n
ns y, if and only if:
LS1: x ≤L y H1: p · x ≤ p · y and H2: p0 · y ≤ p0 · x
where ≤L is the lexicographic order on <n under some indexing of goods (such that
good 1 is given index 1 and good n index n), p ∈ <n
++ and p0 = (p1,p2,...,p n−1,p0
n)
with pn < p0
n.26
We call (<n,≤n
ns) the Lexicographic (p,p0) Net Substitutes poset.
(b) A pair x,y in <n, is comparable with respect to the Lexicographic(p,p0) Net
Complements Partial Order (LNCPO) on <n, w.l.o.g. x ≤n
nc y, if and only if:
LC1: x ≤LC y H1: p · x ≤ p · y and H2: p0 · y ≤ p0 · x
25When the set is bounded below joins and meets can take more complicated form.
26There are (n − 2)! index sets which would give rise to distinct LNSPOs with a priori equivalent
descriptive power in describing good 1 as a (strongly/pathwise) net substitute of good n. However,
we suppress this fact in the notation, and we use the natural indexing whenever this involves no loss
of generality, for notational simplicity.22
where ≤LC is the generalized lexicographic order on <n, under some indexing of goods
(such that good 1 is given index 1 and good n index n), such that x ≤LC y iﬀ y1 < x1,
or y1 = x1 and x−1 ≤L y−1, where x−1 ≡ (x2,...,x n) and p,p0 are as in (a) above.
We call (<n,≤n
nc) the Lexicographic (p,p0) Net Complements poset.
Definition 4.2.
(a) A pair x,y in <n, is comparable with respect to the Augmented Lexicographic
(p,p0) Net Substitutes Partial Order (ALNSPO) on <n, w.l.o.g. x ≤n
ans y, if and only
if:
x ≤n
ns y (i.e. LS1: x ≤L y; H1: p · x ≤ p · y; H2: p0 · y ≤ p0 · x)
(where ≤L, p,p0 are as in Deﬁnition 4.1(a) above)
and (whenever n ≥ 4):
S2: Sk





pi (yi − xi), and ≤E is the usual (Euclidean) order.
We call (<n,≤n
ans) the Augmented Lexicographic (p,p0) Net Substitutes poset.
(b) A pair x,y in <n, is comparable with respect to the Augmented Lexicographic
(p,p0) Net Complements Partial Order (ALNCPO) on <n, w.l.o.g. x ≤n
anc y, if and
only if:
x ≤n
nc y (i.e. LC1: x ≤LC y; H1: p · x ≤ p · y; H2: p0 · y ≤ p0 · x)
(where ≤LC, p,p0 are as in Deﬁnition 4.1(b) above)
and (whenever n ≥ 4):
C2: S2,k





pi (yi − xi), and ≤E is the usual (Euclidean) order.
We call (<n,≤n
anc) the Augmented Lexicographic (p,p0) Net Complements poset.23
Conditions S2 and C2 in deﬁnition 4.2 warrant comment. Their purpose is to force
the choice of the indexing of goods to be such as to give potential complements of good
n high indices. It may be suggested that a simpler way of achieving this is by using:
(S20) (x1,··· ,xk) ≤E (y1,··· ,yk), (yk+1,··· ,yn) ≤E (xk+1,··· ,xn), k ∈ {2,··· ,n −1}
This condition implies (S1) and (S2), but it is not equivalent to them. The problem
with it is that if k is not ﬁxed for all pairs then it fails to be transitive, and ﬁxing k
is unduly limiting. An alternative condition that does give rise to a partial order is:
(D) yk+1 − xk+1 ≤ yk − xk k = 2,...,n −2
This, given (S1), implies (S2). Furthermore, it is not descriptively cumbersome if
applied to each pair of bundles under suitable indexing, and together with (S1), (H1)
and (H2) it deﬁnes a partial order. Indeed, it can be shown that <n is a Hicks
Consistent lattice with the ensuing partial order. The diﬃculty is that <n
+ is not a
Hicks Consistent (sub)lattice. Therefore, we choose to proceed with (S2) (and (C2)).
It is convenient to ﬁrst give the properties of LNSPOs and LNCPOs and this is done
in lemmas 4.1,4.2, and 4.3:
Lemma 4.1.
(a) LNSPOs and LNCPOs are partial orders on <n.
(b) (i) x ≤n
ns y implies x1 ≤ y1, yn ≤ xn and Sn−1
yx ≥ 0;
(ii) x ≤n
nc y implies y1 ≤ x1, yn ≤ xn and Sn−1
yx ≥ 0.
(c) When n = 3 LNSPO coincides with NSPO3 and LNCPO with NCPO3 (deﬁ-
nition 3.1), and when n = 2 LNSPO coincides with NSPO 2 (deﬁnition 1.2).
Proof. See Appendix
Lemma 4.2.
(a) Given Hicks Consistent incomparable pair x,y in the Lexicographic(p,p0) Net
Substitutes poset (<n,≤n
ns), such that w.l.o.g.: (NLS1) y <L x, (H1) p ·x ≤ p ·y, and
(H2) p0 · y ≤ p0 · x (at least one of H1, H2 strict inequality), then
x ∨ y =
Ã







x ∧ y =
Ã







with p · (x ∨ y) = p · y, p0 · (x ∨ y) = p0 · y, p · (x ∧ y) = p · x, p0 · (x ∧ y) = p0 · x, and
(x ∨ y)n−1 + (x ∧ y)n−1 = xn−1 + yn−1







, as in (a) above, their join, x ∨ y, is given by (1) above,
and their meet, x ∧ y, is given by:
x ∧ y =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <






































pi (yi − xi). Also,
p · (x ∨ y) = p · y, p0 · (x ∨ y) = p0 · y, p ·(x ∧ y) = p · x,p0 · (x ∧ y) = p0 · x.
Proof. See Appendix
Lemma 4.3.
(a) Given Hicks Consistent incomparable pair x,y in the Lexicographic(p,p0) Net
Complements poset (<n,≤n
nc), such that w.l.o.g.: (NLC1) y <LC x, (H1) p ·x ≤ p ·y,
and (H2) p0 ·y ≤ p0 ·x (least one of H1, H2 strict inequality), their join is given by 1,
and their meet by 2 in lemma 4.2 above. Furthermore these satisfy p · (x ∨ y) = p · y,
p0·(x ∨ y) = p0·y, p·(x ∧ y) = p·x, p0·(x ∧ y) = p0·x, and (x ∨ y)n−1 +(x ∧y)n−1 =
xn−1 + yn−1.







, as in (a) above, their join is given by 1 in lemma 4.2.
Their meet is well deﬁned and is given by 3 in lemma 4.2 if and only if p1y1 ≤ p−n·x−n.
Proof. See Appendix25
Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3 show that, as in the three goods case, the algebraic structure
of the join and meet of Hicks Consistent pairs in <n under LNSPO and LNCPO is the
same. Obviously the pairs where these occur are mutually exclusive. Consider a Hicks
Consistent pair, x,y, in <n such that w.l.o.g. (H1) p·x ≤ p·y, and (H2) p0 ·y ≤ p0 ·x
(with at least one of H1, H2 a strict inequality): If x1 = y1 then x,y is comparable with
respect to (p,p0) LNSPO if and only if it is comparable with respect to (p,p0) LNCPO.
If x1 6= y1 then x,y is comparable with respect to (p,p0) LNSPO if and only if it is not















. If y1 < x1, so that x,y is incomparable with
respect to LNSPO and comparable with respect to LNCPO, and z ≡ x ∨ns y and
r ≡ x ∧ns y, (lemma 4.2). Then r,z are Hicks Consistent incomparable with respect
to LNCPO, with r ∨nc z = y and r ∧nc z = x. Similarly, if x1 < y1, so that x,y is
incomparable with respect to LNCPO and comparable with respect to LNSPO, and
z = x∨ncy and r = x∧ncy (lemma 4.3). Then r,z are Hicks Consistent incomparable
with respect to LNSPO, with r ∨ns z = y and r ∧ns z = x.
We now turn to the discussion of ALNSPOs and ALNCPOs. Lemma 4.4 collects
some basic properties of ALNSPOS and ALNCPOs and then lemma 4.5 shows that in
comparing any pair of bundles they have no descriptive content over that of LNSPO
and LNCPO respectively, if an appropriate indexing is chosen:
Lemma 4.4.
(a) (i) x ≤n
ans y implies x1 ≤ y1, yn ≤ xn and Sk
yx ≥ 0, k = 2,...,n −1 (and
thus the conditions in S2 are not binding);
(ii) x ≤n
anc y implies y1 ≤ x1, yn ≤ xn, Sn−1
yx ≥ 0 and S2,k
yx ≥ 0, k =
2,...,n −1 (and thus the conditions of C2 are not binding).
(b) ALNSPOs and ALNCPOs are partial orders on <n.
(c) When n = 3 ALNSPO coincides with NSPO3 and ALNCPO with NCPO3




ans y in (<n,≤n
ans) implies x ≤n
ns y in (<n,≤n
ns) under the same indexing,
and x ≤n
anc y in (<n,≤n
anc) implies x ≤n
nc y in (<n,≤n
nc) also under the same indexing.
(b) (i) If x ≤n
ns y in (<n,≤n
ns) under the natural indexing of goods (w.l.o.g.),
then there exists an indexing of goods (where good 1 is given index 1 and good n
index n), possibly diﬀerent, such that x ≤n
ans y in (<n,≤n
ans) under this indexing. In
particular this will be so if goods are indexed according to:
(D) yk+1 − xk+1 ≤ yk − xk k = 2,...,n −2
(ii) If x ≤n
nc y in (<n,≤n
nc) under the natural indexing of goods (w.l.o.g.),
then there exists an indexing of goods (where good 1 is given index 1 and good n
index n), possibly diﬀerent, such that x ≤n
anc y in (<n,≤n
anc) under this indexing. In
particular this will be so if goods are indexed according to (D) as in (i) above.
(c) (i) Given Hicks Consistent incomparable pair x,y in (<n,≤n
ns), i.e. such
that (NS1) y1 < x1, (H1) p · x ≤ p ·y, and (H2) p0 ·y ≤ p0 · x (at least one of H1, H2
strict inequality), then x,y are Hicks Consistent incomparable in (<n,≤n
ans) under the
indexing according to (D) with: (NS1) y1 < x1, (H1) p ·x ≤ p · y, (H2) p0 · y ≤ p0 · x,
and (NS2) S1
yx < 0,...,S k−1
yx < 0 and Sk
yx ≥ 0,...,S n−1
yx ≥ 0, k ∈ {2,...,n − 1},
under this indexing.
(ii) Given Hicks Consistent incomparable pair x,y in (<n,≤n
nc), i.e. such
that (NC1) x1 < y1, (H1) p · x ≤ p ·y, and (H2) p0 · y ≤ p0 ·x (at least one of H1, H2
strict inequality), then x,y are Hicks Consistent incomparable in (<n,≤n
anc) under the
indexing according to (D) with: (NC1) x1 < y1, (H1) p · x ≤ p · y, (H2) p0 · y ≤ p0 · x
and (NC2) S2,2
yx ≥ 0 (if k > 2), ..., S2,k−1
yx ≥ 0, and S2,k
yx < 0, ..., S2,n−1
yx < 0 (if
k < n), for k ∈ {2,...,n }, under this indexing.
Proof. See Appendix
Lemma 4.5(b) shows that ALNSPOs and ALNCPOs do not add descriptive content
overand above LNSPOs and LNCPOs, in the comparison of pairs of bundles. However,
this does not extend to transitive comparisons, since the same indexing may not be
suitable for two diﬀerent binary comparisons under ALNSPO or ALNCPO. Thus, the27
basic Hicks Consistent comparability criterion remains under LNSPOs and LNCPOs.
Based on this, lemma 4.5(c) suggests which Hicks Consistent incomparable pairs in
the richer ALNSPOs and ALNCPOs must be considered, under suitable indexing.
This is applied in the following two lemmas:
Lemma 4.6. Given Hicks Consistent incomparable pair x,y in the Augmented Lex-
icographic (p,p0) Net Substitutes poset (<n,≤n
ans), such that: (NS1) y1 < x1, (H1)
p · x ≤ p · y, and (H2) p0 · y ≤ p0 · x (at least one of H1, H2 strict inequality), and
(NS2) S1
yx < 0,...,S k−1
yx < 0 and Sk
yx ≥ 0,...,S n−1
yx ≥ 0, k ∈ {2,...,n −1}. Then:
(a)
x ∨ y =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <






























yx , ... ,S 2
yx ≥ 0
(4)
x ∧ y =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > :
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with p · (x ∨ y) = p · y, p0 · (x ∨ y) = p0 · y, p · (x ∧ y) = p · x, p0 · (x ∧ y) = p0 · x.
(b) If Sn−2
yx ,...,S 2
yx < 0 then xn−1 < (x ∧ y)n−1 , (x ∨ y)n−1 < yn−1 and
(x ∨ y)n−1 + (x ∧ y)n−1 = xn−1 + yn−1. And in general, if Sn−2
yx ,...,S k
yx ≥ 0 and
Sk−1
yx ,...,S 2
yx < 0, k ∈ {2,...,n −2}, then xk ≤ (x ∨ y)k < yk, xk < (x ∧ y)k ≤ yk







is closed under joins and meets of Hicks Consistent incomparable
pairs, satisfying (NS1), (H1), (H2), and (NS2), taken in the Augmented Lexicographic
(p,p0) Net Substitutes poset (<n,≤n
ans).28
Proof. See Appendix
Lemma 4.7. Given Hicks Consistent incomparable pair x,y in the Augmented Lex-
icographic (p,p0) Net Complements poset (<n,≤n
anc), such that: that (NC1) x1 < y1,
(H1) p ·x ≤ p ·y, (H2) p0 · y ≤ p0 · x (at least one strict inequality) and (NC2) (NC2)
S2,2
yx ≥ 0 (if k > 2), ..., S2,k−1
yx ≥ 0, and S2,k
yx < 0, ..., S2,n−1
yx < 0 (if k < n), for
k ∈ {2,...,n }. Then:
(a)
x ∨ y =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <















pk , if S2,n−1
yx ,...,S 2,k



















x ∧ y =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <















pk , if S2,n−1
yx ,...,S 2,k


























is closed under joins but not under meets of Hicks Consistent
incomparable pairs, satisfying (NC1), (H1), (H2) and (NC2), in the Augmented Lex-
icographic (p,p0) Net Complements poset (<n,≤n
anc).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of lemma 4.6 and is therefore omitted.29

















are Hicks Consistent lattices.27 In





















a Hicks Consistent Sublattice of (<n,≤n
anc).
5. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS FOR NET SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS
REVISITED
In section 2 we gave suﬃcient conditions on preferences for a good to be a path-
wise/strongly net substitute of another, based on the general properties of NSPOs
and NCPOs developed in section 1. The results of the previous section show that the
two main theorems can be applied using LNSPOs and LNCPOs. However, we also
argued in the previous section that these class of partial orders is not normatively
entirely satisfactory. In Corollary 5.1 below we show how the ALNSPOs and can be
used instead (the analogous result with respect to ALNCPO is left to the interested
reader):
Corollary 5.1 (Net Substitutes).
Consider the consumer expenditureminimization problem, EM(p, ¯ u) as in theorem2.1:
(a) If:
(A) The consumption set X, X ⊂ <n, is closed under joins and meets of Hicks
Consistent incomparable pairs satisfying (NS2) in the Augmented Lexicographic(p,p0)
Net Substitutes poset (<n,≤n
ans) for every indexing of goods 2,...,n −1;
(B) The consumer utility function U : X → < is Hicks Consistent Iso-Quasi-
supermodular on X at all such pairs of points in (A), in every Augmented Lexico-
graphic (p,p0) Net Substitutes poset (<n,≤n
ans).
Then, given feasible ¯ u, such that solutions to the problems EM(p, ¯ u) and EM(p0, ¯ u)
exist and are such that there is no excess utility:
argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤P argmin
x∈X
{p
0 · x|U (x) ≥ ¯ u}
27Of course in the case of (<n,≤n
ans) and (<n,≤n
anc), the relevant Hicks Consistent pairs satisfy
(NS2) and (NC2) respectively.30
(where the underlying order on the consumption set is ≤n
ns for some indexing of goods
2,...,n −1), and good 1 is a Pathwise Net Substitute of good n at prices (p,p0) and
at every such attainable utility level ¯ u.
(b) If instead of (A) and (B) in part (a), (A), (B0) and (C) hold, where
(B0) The consumer utility function U : X → < is Hicks Consistent Strictly
Iso-Quasi-supermodular on X at all such pairs of points in (A), in every Augmented
Lexicographic (p,p0) Net Substitutes poset(<n,≤n
ans);
(C) I ≡ argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ∩ argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x|U (x) ≥ ¯ u} contains no




{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤s argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x|U (x) ≥ ¯ u}
(where the underlying order is ≤n
ns for some indexing of goods 2,...,n −1), and good
1 is a Strongly Net Substitute of good n at prices (p,p0) and at every such attainable
utility level ¯ u.
Remark 5. 1. Notice that unlike in theorem 2.1, it is no longer possible to show
in (a) that argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤a argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x|U (x) ≥ ¯ u}, and in (b) that
argmin
x∈X
{p · x| U (x) ≥ ¯ u} ≤c argmin
x∈X
{p0 · x|U (x) ≥ ¯ u}, with underlying order ≤n
ns,
under any -re-indexing of goods 2,...,n −1.
Proof. Follows easily from theorem 2.1 and the results of the previous section.
It is tempting to consider the conditions in corollary 5.1 above, which restrict the
behavior of the utility function within not just one Hicks Consistent poset, but in
all possible ones under some re-indexing of goods 2,...,n − 1, more restrictive than
the conditions of theorem 2.1. However, the Hicks Consistent incomparable pairs
at which the behavior of the utility function is restricted in this class of posets is
also restricted. And, as will be shown with the example of additive preferences, it is
possible that quasi-supermodularity in this class of posets is satisﬁed whereas it is not
in any single poset under LNSPO:31
Corollary 5.2 (Additive Preferences). If consumerpreferencesare additive such
that U : <n
+ → < U (x) ≡ U1 (x1)+ ... +Un(xn) where each Ui is a monotone, con-
cave function, then
(a) The function U is Hicks Consistent quasi-supermodular at all incomparable






, for every re-
indexing of goods 2,...,n − 1, and for every (p,p0) such that p ∈ <n
++ and p0 =
(p1,...,p n−1,p0
n) with pn < p0
n.28
(b) Each good is a pathwise net substitute of every other good everywhere.
Proof. Part (b) follows from (a) and theorem 2.1 above, by observing that the
choice of goods 1 and n is inconsequential in the proof of (a) (note however, that the
quasi-supermodularity established (a) is more than is needed for (b)):
Consider Hicks Consistent incomparable pair x,y, such that (refer to lemma 4.5):
(NS1) y1 < x1, (H1) p · x ≤ p · y, and (H2) p0 · y ≤ p0 · x (where at least one is a
strict inequality), and (NS2) S1
yx < 0,...,S k−1
yx < 0 and Sk
yx ≥ 0,...,S n−1
yx ≥ 0,
k ∈ {2,...,n − 1}. In order to prove the required result, assume that U (x) ≥























+ Uk+1 (yk+1) + ... +





























− Uk (xk) − Uk (yk). Similarly U (x) ≥ U (x ∨ y)





























− Uk (xk) − Uk (yk) ≥ 0 then U (x) ≥
U (x ∧ y) implies U (x ∨ y) ≥ U (y) (strict inequality if U (x) > U (x ∧ y)) and U (x) ≥
U (x ∨ y) implies U (x ∧ y) ≥ U (y) (again strict inequality if U (x) > U (x ∨ y)) i.e.



























= (1 − α)xk + αyk, for some α ∈
28It is possible to construct examples of Hicks Consistent incomparable pairs with LNSPO, with
just four goods, where the quasi-supermodular property may fail for both of the indexings of goods
relevant for the description of good 1 as a net substitute of good 4.32






























≥ Uk (xk)+ Uk (yk) as required, establishing that in-
deed U is quasi-supermodular.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is perhaps surprising that almost half a century of consumer theory has produced
very little in the way of conditions on consumer preferences that suﬃce to sign net
substitution eﬀects. We hope that the suﬃcient conditions oﬀered in this paper con-
tribute in this direction, and that in the process the versatility of the proposed order
theoretic framework is established. The methods exploit the order/lattice structure of
a problem, and it is important therefore to identify the appropriate order structures
inherent to the problem in hand before applying the general lattice programming theo-
rems and results. The strength of the results relies on the stregth of these order/lattice
structures.
It is hoped that the results of this paper can be helpful in both theoretical and
applied work. On the applied side, it can be envisaged that the methods developed can
be used to develop market research methods based on the questionnaire approach. It
is not easy to structure questionnaires that may conﬁrm or otherwise that consumers
have, for example, additive preferences. But it would seem possible to construct
a ﬁnite set of questions, which can suggest with some degree of accuracy whether
consumer preferences satisfy quasi-supermodularity conditions as developed here. On
the theoretical side, at least part of the attraction of the proposed approach is that it
can be applied in cases with non-convexities and indivisibilities, to name but a couple
of its diﬀerences with standard approaches. In this paper we have worked within a
conventional setting and hinted only at possible extensions. It would be useful to
carry out such extensions explicitly.
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) provide an order theoretic (and a diﬀerential) gener-
alization of the (Spence-Mirlees) Single Crossing Property, paving the way for more
versatile extensions of asymmetric information models beyond the standard two vari-
able, one dimensional information characteristic, set-up. One such problem is that33
of the incentive compatible proﬁt maximizing, or optimal, non-linear price schedule
for a good, when consumers preferences over many goods are explicitly modeled, as
opposed to the standard practice of using reduced demand functions. This example
is suggestive because it raises the question of the applicability of lattice programming
techniques to problems where there are budgetary trade-oﬀs between the variables.
This is a diﬃcult problem. The diﬃculty manifests itself in the fact that constraint
sets involving budgetary trade-oﬀs between more than two variables do not availthem-
selves to strong set comparability (or even weaker forms of set comparability) under
commonly used partial orders, most notably the Euclidean order, as lattice program-
ming theorems require. It is the aim of the research agenda, of which this paper is a




(b) (i) and (ii): x1 ≤ y1 (y1 ≤ x1) follows from LS1 (LC1). yn ≤ xn and
Sn−1
yx ≥ 0 follow from H1 and H2.
(c) It is obvious that when n = 3 comparability with respect to LNSPO (LNCPO)
implies comparability with respect to NSPO3 (NCPO3). Forthe converse, assume ﬁrst
x ≤3
ns y and therefore x1 ≤ y1 and y3 ≤ x3. If x1 < y1 then clearly x ≤n
ns y. If x1 = y1
then S2
yx ≥ 0 implies x2 ≤ y2. If the inequality is strict there is again nothing further
to prove. If x2 = y2 then from H1 and H2 y3 = x3. Hence x ≤3
ns y implies x ≤L y
and therefore x ≤n
ns y as required. The argument establishing that x ≤3
nc y implies
x ≤n
nc y is very similar. The case n = 2 is trivial.
Proof (Lemma 4.2).
(a) Considering ﬁrst the join of x,y: Let z ≡ (x1,x2,...,x n−2,zn−1,y n) with
zn−1 ≡ xn−1 +
Sn−1
yx
pn−1 . Clearly xn−1 < zn−1, and y <L x <L z. Also p · z = p · y and
p0·z = p0·y. Hence x ≤n
ns z and y ≤n
ns z, i.e. z is an upper bound of x,y. Consider next
any upper bound, w ≡ (w1,...,w n). By deﬁnition y <L x ≤L w, p · x ≤ p · y ≤ p · w
and p0·w ≤ p0·y ≤ p0·x and in particular wn ≤ yn = zn. If x1 < w1, or if xi−1 = wi−134
and xi < wi , i = 2,...,n − 2 then z <L w and z ≤n
ns w as required. Therefore,
suppose xi = wi, i = 1,...,n − 2. If wn−1 < zn−1 then p · z = p · y ≤ p · w implies
yn = zn < wn contradicting wn ≤ yn = zn. Therefore, zn−1 ≤ wn−1. If zn−1 < wn−1
then z <L w as required and if zn−1 = wn−1, then wn ≤ yn = zn and p·z = p·y ≤ p·w
imply wn = yn = zn, i.e. z = w, thus completing the proof that z ≤n
ns w, i.e. z is the
join of x,y.




pn−1 . Clearly rn−1 < yn−1, and r <L y <L x. Also p · r = p · x and
p0 · r = p0 · x. Hence r ≤n
ns x and r ≤n
ns y, i.e. r is a lower bound of x,y. Consider
any lower bound s ≡ (s1,...,s n). By deﬁnition s ≤L y <L x, p · s ≤ p · x ≤ p · y, and
p0 · y ≤ p0 · x ≤ p0 · s and in particular rn = xn ≤ sn. If s1 < y1, or if yi−1 = si−1,
and si < yi, i = 2,...,n −2, then s <L r and s ≤n
ns r as required. Therefore suppose
yi = si, i = 1,...,n −2. If rn−1 < sn−1 then p ·s ≤ p·x = p·r implies sn < rn = xn,
contradicting rn = xn ≤ sn. Therefore, sn−1 ≤ rn−1. If sn−1 < rn−1, then s <L r
and s ≤n
ns r as required. If sn−1 = rn−1, then rn = xn ≤ sn and p · s ≤ p · x = p · r,
imply sn = rn = xn, i.e. s = r, thus completing the proof that s ≤n
ns r, i.e. r is the
meet of x,y.








+ whenever x,y ∈ <n
+,
the proof for the join is the same as in part (a). Therefore we only need to amend the
proof of part (a) in the case of the meet:
Case 1; Sn−1













. The hypotheses of this case
implies rk ∈ <n
+ and furthermore rk
k < yk, p · rk = p · x and p0 · rk = p0 · x. Hence
rk <L y <L x and rk ≤n
ns x,y, i.e. rk is a lower bound of x,y. Consider any
lower bound s ≡ (s1,...,s n). By deﬁnition s ≤L y <L x, p · s ≤ p · x ≤ p · y, and
p0 · y ≤ p0 · x ≤ p0 · s, and in particular xn = rk
n ≤ sn. If s1 < y1, or if yi−1 = si−1,
and si < yi, i = 2,...,k − 1, then s <L rk and s ≤n
ns rk as required. Therefore,
suppose yi = si, i = 1,...,k − 1. If rk
k < sk then this along with xn = rk
n ≤ sn, in
p ·s ≤ p ·rk = p · x or pksk + ··· +pnsn ≤ pkr2
k +pnrk
n, imply si < 0 some k < i < n,
contradicting s ∈ <n
+. Therefore sk ≤ rk
k. If sk < rk
k then s <L rk and s ≤n
ns rk as
required. Therefore suppose sk = rk
k. But then pk+1sk+1 + ··· + pnsn ≤ pnrk
n, given
xn = rk
n ≤ sn, implies si = 0, i = k +1,...,n −1, and xn = rk
n = sn, i.e. s = rk, thus35
completing the proof that s ≤n
ns rk, i.e. rk is the meet of x,y.
Case 3; S3,n−1
y < Sn−1









2 ≥ 0 is
equivalent to Sn−1
yx ≤ S2,n−1
y or p1y1 ≤ p−n · x−n which is clearly true since by
hypothesis y <L x. Therefore, r2 ∈ <n
+. The rest of the proof is identical to the
general proof in case 2 above.
Proof (Lemma 4.3).
The proof is very similar to the proof of lemma 4.2 and is therefore not repeated here.
We only remark that the meet of x,y does not exist when p−n · x−n < p1y1 since the
meet, if it exists, must be such that (x ∧ y)1 = y1 and (x ∧ y)n = xn. But this is incom-
patible with p · (x ∧ y) ≤ p · x in this case.
Proof (Lemma 4.4).
(a) (i) x1 ≤ y1, yn ≤ xn and Sn−1
yx ≥ 0 are consequences of x ≤n
ns y (see
lemma 4.1). Suppose Sk
yx < 0, some k ∈ {2,...,n −2}. But then by (S2), Sk+1
yx < 0,
..., Sn−1
yx < 0, contradicting, Sn−1
yx ≥ 0. Thus, Sk
yx ≥ 0, k = 2,...,n − 2 whenever
x ≤n
ans y.
(ii) y1 ≤ x1, yn ≤ xn, Sn−1
yx ≥ 0 and S2,n−1
yx ≥ 0 are consequences of
x ≤n
nc y. Suppose S2,k
yx < 0, some k ∈ {2,...,n − 2}. But then by (C2), S2,k+1
yx < 0,
..., S2,n−1
yx < 0, contradicting, S2,n−1
yx ≥ 0. Thus, S2,k
yx ≥ 0, k = 2,...,n −2, whenever
x ≤n
anc y.
(b) ALNSPO: Reﬂexivity and antisymmetry are obvious. In order to establish
transitivity assume x ≤n
ans y and y ≤n
ans z. Hence x ≤n
ns z. From (a)(i) above
Sk
yx ≥ 0, and Sk
zy ≥ 0, k = 2,...,n −2, implying Sk
zx ≥ 0, k = 2,...,n −2, rendering
the conditions of (S2) non-binding. Hence x ≤n
ans z as required. The argument for
ALNCPO is analogous.
(c) Followsfrom lemma 4.1(c) since by construction (S2) and (C2) are inapplicable
when n = 2,3.36
Proof (Lemma 4.5).
(a) This is obvious from deﬁnitions 4.1 and 4.2.
(b) (i) We show that the indices of goods 2,...,n −2 can be chosen so that
Sk
yx ≥ 0 , k = 2,...,n − 1. Suppose this is not true under the natural indexing. An
indexing that will work (not necessarily unique) is one which indexes goods according
to (D) yk+1 − xk+1 ≤ yk − xk, k = 2,...,n −2. Under this indexing, if Sk
yx < 0 for
some k, then Sk+1
yx < 0,..., Sn−1
yx < 0, contradicting, Sn−1
yx ≥ 0. Furthermore, under
this indexing clearly x ≤L y, and (H1) and (H2) are unaﬀected by the re-indexing.
(ii) The proof is almost identical to (i) and is therefore omitted.
(c) Obvious, using the same argument as in (b) above.
Proof (Lemma 4.6).
(a) Considering ﬁrst the join of x,y: Let
z =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <




































pk = xk +
Sk
yx
pk ≥ xk, k = 2,...,n − 1, whenever Sk
yx ≥ 0. If this is
strict inequality the result follows immediately. If Sk
yx = 0, Sk+1
yx ≥ 0 is equivalent to
zk+1 = yk+1 ≥ xk+1. If this is strict inequality the result again follows. Similarly, if
Sk+1
yx = 0 ,..., Sn−2
yx = 0 (i.e. yk+1 = xk+1,...,y n−2 = xn−2) then Sn−1
yx > 0 (implied
by H1, H2 where at least one is strict inequality) implies xn−1 < yn−1. Hence x <L z
as required. Therefore x ≤n
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yx ≥ 0& Sk−1
yx ,...,S 2
yx < 037
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yx ≥ 0, &Sn−3
yx ,...,S 2
yx < 0 ...
Sn−2
yx ,...,S k+1











Therefore the conditions of S2 do not apply and x ≤n
ans z, and y ≤n
ans z, i.e. z is an
upper bound of x,y. Consider any other upper bound of x,y, say r;
Case 1; Suppose Sn−2
yx ,...,S 2




rx ≥ 0 , k =
2,...,n −2, since Sk
zx = 0 from above and Sk
rx ≥ 0 since x ≤n
ans r (refer to lemma 4.4).
This means that if z ≤n
ns r then z ≤n
ans r since the conditions of S2 are inapplicable.
But z ≤n
ns r follows from the proof of lemma 4.2 and therefore z ≤n
ans r as required.
Case 2; Suppose Sn−2
yx ,...,S k
yx ≥ 0, Sk−1
yx ,...,S 2





rx ≥ 0 for m = 2,...,k −1 since Sm
zx = 0 from above and
Sm
rx ≥ 0 since x ≤n




ry ≥ 0 for m = k,...,n − 2
since again Sm
zy = 0 from above and Sm
ry ≥ 0. Therefore the conditions of S2 do not
apply and z ≤n
ns r implies z ≤n
ans r. If r1 < x1 or if ri−1 = xi−1 and ri < xi,
i = 2,...,k −1 then r <L x, contradicting x ≤n
ans r. If x1 < r1 or if ri−1 = xi−1 and
xi < ri, i = 2,...,k −1 then z ≤n
ns r and therefore z ≤n
ans r. Hence assume ri = xi,
i = 1,...,k −1 and suppose that xk ≤ rk < zk. Therefore Sk
ry < Sk
zy = 0 contradicting
Sk
ry ≥ 0. Hence zk ≤ rk; if the inequality is strict then z ≤n
ns r and z ≤n
ans r. Therefore
assume zk = rk. If rk+1 < zk+1 = yk+1 or if ri−1 = zi−1 = yi−1 and ri < zi = yi,
i = k + 2,...,n −2 then again Si
ry < Si
zy = 0 contradicting Si
ry ≥ 0. Ifzk+1 = yk+1 <
rk+1 or if ri−1 = zi−1 = yi−1 and zi = yi < ri, i = k + 2,...,n − 2 then z ≤n
ns r and
therefore z ≤n
ans r. Therefore assume further ri = zi = yi, i = k+1,...,n −2. If next
rn−1 < zn−1 = yn−1 then using p · z = p · y ≤ p · r, zn = yn < rn which contradicts
rn ≤ yn (implied by p ·y ≤ p ·r and p0 ·r ≤ p0 ·y). Hence zn−1 = yn−1 ≤ rn−1. Again
if the inequality is strict then z ≤n
ns r and z ≤n
ans r. If yn−1 = rn−1 then rn = yn and
r = z, thus completing the proof that z ≤n
ans r for each upper bound of x,y and thus
z = x ∨ y.
Considering next the meet of x,y (the proof is analogous to the argument establishing38
the join and may be omitted). Let
w =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > <




































pk = yk −
Sk
yx
pk ≤ yk, k = 2,...,n − 1, whenever Sk
yx ≥ 0. If this is
strict inequality the result follows. If Sk
yx = 0, Sk+1
yx ≥ 0 is equivalent to wk+1 =
xk+1 ≤ yk+1. If this is strict inequality then again the result follows. Similarly, if
Sk+1
yx = 0,..., Sn−2
yx = 0 (i.e. yk+1 = xk+1,...,y n−2 = xn−2) then Sn−1
yx > 0 (implied
by H1, H2 where at least one is strict inequality) implies xn−1 < yn−1 and w <L y as
required. Therefore w ≤n
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yx ≥ 0, &Sk−1
yx ,...,S 2
yx < 0
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yx ≥ 0, &Sn−3
yx ,...,S 2
yx < 0 ...
Sn−2
yx ,...,S k+1





yx ≥ 0, &Sk−1
yx ,...,S 2




Therefore the conditions of S2 do not apply; w ≤n
ans x, and w ≤n
ans y, i.e. w is a lower
bound of x,y. Consider any other lower bound of x,y, say r;
Case 1; Suppose Sn−2
yx ,...,S 2




yr ≥ 0, k =
2,...,n − 2, since Sk
yw = 0 from above and Sk
yr ≥ 0 since r ≤n
ans y (refer to lemma
4.4). This means that if r ≤n
ns w then r ≤n
ans w since the conditions of S2 are
inapplicable. But r ≤n
ns w follows from lemma 4.2 and therefore r ≤n
ans w as required.
Case 2; Suppose Sn−2
yx ,...,S k
yx ≥ 0, Sk−1
yx ,...,S 2





yr ≥ 0 for m = 2,...,k − 1 since from above and39
Sm
yr ≥ 0 since r ≤n




xr ≥ 0 for m = k,...,n −2
since again Sm
xw = 0 from above and Sm
xr ≥ 0. Therefore the conditions of S2 do
not apply and r ≤n
ns w implies r ≤n
ans w. If y1 < r1 or if yi−1 = ri−1 and yi < ri,
i = 2,...,k − 1 then y <L r, contradicting r ≤n
ans y. If r1 < y1 or if yi−1 = ri−1
and ri < yi, i = 2,...,k − 1 then r ≤n
ns w and therefore r ≤n
ans w. Hence assume




xr ≥ 0. Hence rk ≤ wk; if the inequality is strict then r ≤n
ns w and
r ≤n
ans w. Therefore assume rk = wk. If xk+1 = wk+1 < rk+1 or if xi−1 = wi−1 = ri−1
and xi = wi < ri, i = k+2,...,n −2 then again Si
xr < Si
xw = 0 contradicting Si
xr ≥ 0.
If rk+1 < wk+1 = xk+1 or if ri−1 = wi−1 = xi−1 and ri < wi = xi, i = k +2,...,n −2
then r ≤n
ns w and therefore r ≤n
ans w. Therefore assume further ri = wi = xi,
i = k + 1,...,n − 2. If next wn−1 = xn−1 < rn−1 then using p · r ≤ p · w = p · x,
rn < wn = xn which contradicts xn ≤ rn (implied by p · r ≤ p · x and p0 · x ≤ p0 · r).
Hence rn−1 ≤ wn−1 = xn−1. Again if the inequality is strict then r ≤n
ns w and
r ≤n
ans w. If rn−1 = wn−1 then rn = xn and r = w, thus completing the proof that
r ≤n
ans w for each lower bound of x,y. Thus w = x ∧ y.
(b) and (c) : Obvious from the proof of (a)40
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